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LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW IN SOUTH KOREA
Laura Watson
Abstract: Tis Comment looks at labor legislation's role in shaping the present state
of labor relations in South Korea A brief history of the government's symbiotic relationship
with business serves as a backdrop for assessing the current laws. The laws have an
employer bias accenluated by the broad administrative oversighit government has over labor
relations. More troublesome provisions of the laws are considered in detail. This Comment
then turns to recent pro-labor changes in the laws but discusses why labor unions are
unlikely to achieve full equality in labor relations at this juncture. In conclusion, this
Comment makes suggestions for change based on the premise that labor negotiations should
be conducted by the parties on an equal footing.
I. INTRODUCTION
South Korea represents a modem miracle of rapid industrialization and
unprecedented economic growth.' However, not all South Korean citizens
have fully enjoyed the fruits of the nation's economic success. South Korean
employees work under repressive labor standards2 and, historically, labor
unions have been subdued by government and business.3 At the beginning of
the nation's economic growth, the South Korean government embarked upon
an economic course that promoted certain key businesses but resulted in the
repression of budding labor unions.4 Perhaps repression of unions did
contribute to the rapidity of South Korea's economic growth, but now that
South Korea is snug in its position as the eleventh largest economy in the
world,5 further repression does not seem justified. Nonetheless, the State has
been reluctant to revise its pro-business labor laws because of its symbiotic
relationship with the business community.6 The nexus forged between
1 See generally EZRA F. VOGEL, THE FOUR LrrrLE DRAGONS (1991). See also HANS UNNEMANN ET
AL., EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 318-29 (1987).
2 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RETREAT FROM REFORM: LABOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF
EXPREssION IN SOUTH KOREA (1990); Richard Dicker, South Korea Labor Rights Violations Under
Democratic Rule, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 196 (1996).
See generally JANG JIP CHOI, LABOR AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: LABOR UNIONS IN SOUTH
KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1961-1980 (1989); GEORGE E. OGLE, SOUTH KOREA: DISSENT
WITHIN THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE (1990).
4 Young-bum Parc, State Regulation, the Labour Market and Economic Development: The
Republic of Korea, in WORKERS, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA 149-76 (Gerry Rodgers
ed., 1994).
5 Michael Schuman, International: OECD Invitation Gives South Korea an Incentive to Tune Up
Its Economy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1996, at A15.
6 See discussion infra Section I.
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business and government during the period of industrialization represents the
greatest obstacle to meaningful change in the present labor legislation. By
amending the laws to accord unions greater rights, the State must contend
with the danger of biting the hand that feeds it.
This Comment first considers the nature and history of the business-
government nexus and how labor repression was a logical outgrowth of this
nexus. It then discusses the three relevant labor laws, the Labor Union Act;
7
the Labor Dispute Mediation Act;8 and the Labor and Management Council
Act.9  This Comment will demonstrate how these statutes provide for
extensive administrative oversight of labor relations. The administration has
used the letter of the law to considerably manipulate union formation and give
business a marked edge in labor relations. As long as the business-
government nexus continues to exist, any law providing for broad
administrative oversight will result in repression of labor activism. In light of
this thesis, this Comment concludes by suggesting potential amendments for
South Korea's labor laws based on the notion that significant changes must be
implemented to insure that South Korean workers enjoy the same rights to
freedom of association and collective bargaining taken for granted by workers
in many other industrialized countries.
II. KOREA INCORPORATED
South Korea (hereinafter Korea) can be described as a "corporatist
state."'1  Corporatism must be distinguished from pluralism, the style of
government typically associated with democracies. In a pluralistic state, law
and policy result from pressures placed on a passive government by various
interest groups.1 In contrast, a corporatist government selects a set of
policies then uses its citizens and entities as instruments to effectuate these
policies. 12  Thus, the government in a corporatist state is highly
interventionist. It chooses goals and then uses its citizenry to implement
them.
7 NODONG CHOHAPP6P [Labor Union Act] (1997) [hereinafter Labor Union Act].
a NODONGCHAENGUI CHOCHONGP6P [Labor Dispute Mediation Act] (1987) [hereinafter Labor
Dispute Mediation Act].
9 NOSAHY6PUtHOEPIP [Labor-Management Council Act] (1987) [hereinafter Labor-Managemnent
Council Act].
10 CHO,supra note 3,at 11.
" Id. at 5-6.
12 Id.
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Following the Korean War, the corporatist Korean government opted
to transform its agrarian economy into an industrial one. 13  The State
aggressively pursued export-oriented industrialization by strongly
encouraging the development of labor-intensive manufacturing industries.
14
Huge conglomerates, called "chaebols," arose during this period. 15 The
government, which owned and controlled the banks, inspired the formation of
chaebols by subsidizing them through preferential credit, low-interest loans,
and tax incentives. 16  The State also kept wages relatively low by directly
engaging in wage setting.
17
A business-government nexus was forged by the State's active
intervention in business matters. Government "rewarded" entrepreneurs who
complied with its policies by publicly honoring them and, of course,
permitting them to become wealthy.' 8  In return, the government received
legitimacy and political support from the chaebols.' 9 During the early years
of industrialization, the chaebols were primarily instruments of state power.
The State dominated the direction of industrialization and chaebols were
compelled to comply or lose their preferential economic treatment.
20
However, as chaebols' economic prominence increased, the puppet-master
relationship transformed into a relationship based on mutual dependence.2'
Chaebols now exert considerable political influence, especially those that
have a highly collaborative relationship with the state.
22
The State's collusion with business has led to severe repression of
workers' rights to organize and engage in collective action.23 The State had
twin motives in repressing these rights. First, suppression of unions helped
13 LINNEMANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 319.
14 Id. at 319-23.
15 VOGEL, supra note 1, at 61.
16 id.
17 See Taigi Kim, Human Resource Management for Production Workers in Large Korean
Manufacturing Enterprises, in INDUSTRIALIZATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 216, 220 (Stephen Frenkel &
JeffreyHarrod eds., 1995). See also Park, supra note4, at 156-58.
I' CARTER J. ECKERT ET AL., KOREA OLD AND NEW: A HISTORY 405 (1990).
19 See Richard F. Donor & Gary Hawes, The Political Economy of Growth in Southeast and
Northeast Asia, in THE CHANGING PoLITcAL EcONOMY OF THE THIRD WORLD 145, 155 (MaIochehr Dorraj
ed., 1995). The Korean government has always needed the appearance of legitimacy because, until 1987, it
was an authoritarian regime. ECKERT ET AL., supra note 18, at 347-87. The first democratic election was held
in 1987, but Korea is still trying to shake off its authoritarian past. Id.
20 LINNEMANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 322-23.
21 See CHOI, supra note 3, at 208.
22 Id. at 98.
23 This is true despite the fact hat, in Korea, these rights have attained constitutional status.
HANKUKH6NP6P [KOREA CONST.] art. 33(1) ('To enhance working conditions, workers shall have the right to
independent association, collective bargaining and collective action.").
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insure that industrial strife would not hamper the State's goal of pursuing
export-led production.2 4  Secondly, the State enriched its symbiotic
relationship with the business community by using its police power to
maintain workplace order.25 For labor advocates, this latter motive may be
much more disturbing. Because Korea has already achieved economic
success, suppression of unions is no longer necessary as an end in itself.
However, by subduing workers to placate employers, the government has
created an environment where business has never had to seriously deal with
unions.2 6 Since most employers probably expect that favoritism in labor
relations will continue, if the government makes significant legislative
concessions to labor unions, business is likely to resist these changes.2 7
Consequently, the State may have to separate itself from corporate influences
before it can institute changes that accord workers full rights.
Repression of labor has been both direct and indirect. The latter type
of repression arises from the labor laws themselves and is discussed in the
next section. The more direct forms of repression also deserve comment to
demonstrate the present essence of labor relations. Some of the more
notorious tactics utilized by the government have included brutal police
intervention during strikes,2" widespread arrests of union members, 29 and
kidnappings followed by brainwashing at so-called "purification camps." 30
Even when the State's intervention is not direct, it implicitly
encourages employers to use self-help to deter union activity. For example,
employers are permitted to hire management thugs called kusadae to threaten
and assault union organizers.3 1 The government has also aided employers by
compiling black lists identifying employee troublemakers.32 Additionally, the
government attempts to incite public disapprobation for union activities by
blaming unions for any economic downturn experienced by the nation as a
whole and concomitantly presenting union members as selfish and
24 Park supra note4, at 152.
25 OGLE, supra note 3, at 59-61.
26 See Jong-il You, Labour Institutions and Economic Development in the Republic of Korea, in
WORKERS, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA, 177, 205 (Gerry Rodgers ed., 1994).27 The government has made moderate amendments to its labor laws in the past few years. Employers'
resistance to the laws have resulted in a high level of conflict. Id.
2 OGLE, supra note 3, at 60.
29 Dicker, supra note 2, at 208.
o OGLE, supra note 3, at 55.
31 Id. at 61-62. Kusadae means "Save Our Company Group."
32 Hagen Koo, The State, Minjung and the Working Class in South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY KOREA 131, 148 (HagenKoo ed., 1989).
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individualistic.33 Although kidnappings and purification camps seem to be a
remnant of Korea's authoritarian past, violent strikebreaking, arrests, and
scapegoating of unions persist in modem Korea.34 Any thorough examination
of Korea's present labor relations must be conducted against this backdrop of
overt, extralegal discouragement of union membership and activity.
IH. RELEVANT LABOR LAWS
Facially, Korea's labor laws do not appear particularly biased against
unions. In fact, the initial Labor Union Act passed in 1953 resembled the
United States' pro-labor Wagner Act of 1935. 35 However, the laws must be
understood within their proper context. Prosecutorial discretion and selective
enforcement have been continuous problems. 36  In addition to these
administrative shortcomings, the laws themselves reflect a pattern of labor
repression and pro-employer state policy.
A. The Labor Union Act
The Labor Union Act provides for extensive administrative
oversight of every stage of union activity. In order to be recognized as the
employees' bargaining representative, the union must report to the
administrative authority and submit information including union title,
location of its office, number of members, names and addresses of
officers, and the title of its federation. 37  Any changes in this information
must be submitted to the administrative authority within fifteen days. 8
33 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 29-30. See also CHOI, supra note 3, at 13 (discussing
government's attempt to instill its brand of work ethics in employees).
,, During a three week period of intense labor unrest following passage of a pro-businss law in
December 1996, the government rather unsuccessfully attempted to use all three of these tactics. Police armed
with tear gas were used to break up demonstrations. Ju-Yeon Kim, Korean Protests Mushrooming Into
Political Crisis, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at A28. Prosecutors issued arrests for several union officials and
President Kim Young Sam asked the nation, "If business fails, where will the workers be? You nmst let
businesses live .... Those with whom the workers and firms should be competing with are their foreign
counterparts." David Holley, S. Korean Strikes in Crucial Phase, Analysts Say Asia: President Kim
Rejects Unions' Demands to Scrap New Law Making it Easier to Lay Off Workers, L.A. TIMES, Jan- 7,
1997, at A12.
" CHOL supra note 3, at 85. Labor Union Act, supra note 7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1996).
36 Hwang-Joe Kim, The Korean Union Movement in Transition, in ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION 133, 148 (Stephen Frenkel, ed. 1993) (although the law prohibits unfair labor practices,
employers have been able to commit them with "virtual impunity").
37 Labor Union Act, supra note 7, art. 13(1).
39 id.
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The administrative authority is defined as the mayor of Seoul, the mayor
of the situs of the workplace, or the provincial governor.39 With the
exception of the mayor of Seoul, these officials are presidential appointees
rather than elected representatives.4 0  Thus, members of the electorate
have no ability to directly influence the administrative authorities by using
the franchise to eject administrators who make biased decisions or to
attempt to elect candidates who represent their interests.
An administrative authority has three options when it receives an
application for recognition from a union.41  First, it can recognize the
union; second, it can refuse to recognize the union; or third, it can delay
recognition until the union completes a request for more thorough
information. Often, "the routine decision to recognize a union is a
disguised political decision." '4 2  When an administrator postpones
recognition, it usually "warns" the employer of the employees' organizing
attempts thereby giving the employer an opportunity to use self-help to
break up the union before it is officially recognized.43 The delaying tactic
has also contributed to the widespread problem of company unions.
Because multiple unions per shop are basically prohibited,44 once the
employer is warned of imminent unionization, it can quickly register a
faux union while the real organizers attempt to comply with the law's
cumbersome requirements.45
Once a union is certified, administrative oversight does not cease.
Unions are required to enact by-laws4 6 and submit them to the
administrative authority.4 7 The administrator then interprets the by-laws
and has power to make unilateral amendments with permission of the labor
committee if it determines that the laws "conflict with laws and
39 id.
40 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 111.
4' Labor Union Actsupra note 7, art. 12 (Supp. 1997).
42 CHOI, supra note 3, at 103.
43 Id. at 102.
44 Labor Union Act, supra note 7, art. 5(1) (Supp. 1997). Despite the ban on multiple unions, workers
recently achieved a significant victory when the government agreed to officially recognize the formerly illegal
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions as an alternative to the much me moderate Federation of Korean
Trade Unions ("FKTU"). Michael Schuman & In Kyung Kim, South Korea Passes Watered-Down Labor
Legislation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1997, at A19. The FKTU was initially a sham union set up by the
government and, hence, many workers question whether it really advances their interests. See OGLE, supra
note3, at 12-13.
45 OGLE, supra note 3, at 58-59.
46 Labor Union Actsupra note 7, art. 14 (Supp. 1997).
47 Id. art. 13.
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regulations relating to labor." 48  The union must also keep extensive
records49 that are subject to inspection at any time by the administrative
authority.50 This unlimited right to inspect union records is especially
significant because the administrator is given concomitant authority to
unilaterally abrogate or modify any resolution or measure taken by the
union if it "conflicts with laws and regulations related to labor or the by-
laws .. ,,.l Additionally, unions' financial records are audited every six
months, or more frequently at the discretion of the auditor.52 Employers'
documents and records pertaining to labor relations do not seem to be
similarly scrutinized.
The administrative authority also has ultimate veto power over the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The employer and union must
submit their agreement to the administrator within fifteen days of its
execution.5 3  Pursuant to a resolution of the labor committee, the
administrator may change or cancel terms that it deems "illegal or
unjustifiable."54 Since the State has previously capped wages, any term
providing for greater wages than those set by the State would be
invalidated as illegal. Under the statute, the term does not need to be
illegal to be rendered void; "unjustifiable" agreement provisions may also
be struck. 55 "Unjustifiable" does not describe a precise standard and an
administrative authority could presumably determine for himself which
provisions are "unjustified."
B. The Labor Dispute Mediation Act
Considering the government's extensive control over the substantive
terms of agreements, one should not be surprised to learn that the collective
bargaining process has not led to concrete changes in the workplace. With the
State backing it up, the employer has little incentive to earnestly face the
union across the bargaining table. Thus, workplace gains have generally not
I d. art. 12.
49 Id. art. 14.
'0 Id. art. 13(2).
"' Id art. 21. The legislature has essentially given the adrninistrators superior authority to interpret and
apply the unon's own by-laws by perrniting the administrators to define when a union's activities contravene
its laws.
2 Id. art. 25.
SId. art. 31(2).
14 Id. art. 31(3).
55 Id.
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arisen from collective bargaining but rather from industrial action followed by
negotiations.5 6 Since strikes and demonstrations have traditionally been the
only means for unions to achieve real gains, Korean unionists have earned a
reputation for being extremely militant.57 However, the government has the
capacity to counteract unions' disruptive industrial actions by intervening
through the Labor Dispute Mediation Act.
Under the Act, a union must disclose its intention to strike to the
employer, the labor committee, and the administrative authority.58  After
disclosure, the union is required to "cool off" for ten days before instituting
the strike.5 9  Thus, unions are legally precluded from exerting economic
pressure by "springing" strikes on employers. During the ten-day interim, the
employer may plan retaliatory measures although the employer is not legally
permitted to lock out its workers until they have officially struck.60 The
administrative authority has broad statutory authority to suspend acts of
dispute that constitute "acts of violence or subversion'61 or an act that
"suspends, discontinues or obstructs the normal maintenance and operation of
facilities installed for safety protection at factories, workplaces or any other
places of work... ..6 2 Presumably, the administrative authority could wholly
prevent a certain industrial action by declaring it illegal within ten days after
the union discloses its intention to engage in the action.
The Act mainly focuses on resolving disputes once they have arisen.
Although the employer and union can agree to utilize their own dispute
resolution mechanisms, 63 the government generally plays a central role in
dispute resolution. The statute provides for a two-step cooperative process.
First, the parties to the dispute will attempt conciliation.64 The conciliator is
chosen by the labor committee 65 and has authority to compel production of
56 Kim, supra note 36, at 154.
51 See South Korea: Not So Militant, ECONOMIST, June 10, 1995, at 35 (discussing the illegal
activities of a "dissidern" unrecognized labor organization and the approximately 3500 "illegal" strikes in
1987). See also John Burton, News: Asia Pacific: South Korea Faces Bout of Labour Unrest, FIN. TIMES,
June 20, 1996, at 4 (outlining the militant activities of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions to demand
recognition).
58 Labor Dispute Mediation Act, supra note8, art. 16.
'9 Id. art. 14.
60 Id. art. 17.
61 Id. art. 13(1).
62 Id. art. 13(2).
63 Id.
6 Id. arts. 18-21.
65 Id. art. 18(l)-(2). The labor committee first prepares a list of possible conciliators then chooses from
among the names on its list in the event of a dispute.
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witnesses or evidence. 66 If conciliation is unsuccessful, the dispute proceeds
to mediation. 67 A three-person mediation panel hears the parties' arguments
68
then issues a written recommendation to the parties.69 The recommendation
becomes binding if the parties accept it.70 The labor committee can order
binding arbitration in lieu of conciliation and mediation if the dispute involves
a public utility, both parties request arbitration, or one party requests
arbitration pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.71
Korea's dispute resolution machinery seems just and workable and,
indeed, it would be just if the State were neutral like the statutory scheme
suggests. However, because the State is in collusion with business, unions
are disadvantaged when the State intervenes in disputes. The Act's
provisions on emergency mediation best illustrate the potential for abuse. The
Minister of Labor has discretion to order mediation if "acts of dispute are
related to a business of public interest, or it is of such scope or character that
there exists a danger which might substantially impair the nation's economy
or endanger the daily life of the general public." 72 Once emergency mediation
is ordered, both parties must suspend all acts of dispute.73
If the Labor Committee determines that mediation "is unlikely to be
obtained," it will order binding arbitration. 74 Both mediation and arbitration
are conducted by the Labor Committee. 75 Thus, once the Minister of Labor
decides that an emergency exists, he can force the union to submit a dispute
to a panel of arbitrators likely to be biased in favor of the union's opponent.
The broad definition of "emergency" means that several industrial disputes
may be channeled to arbitration under the emergency mediation provisions of
the Act. Historically, compulsory arbitration has negatively impacted wages
and working conditions.76 Unions perceive mandated dispute resolution as "a
government device to suppress the labor movement." 77 Thus, forcing a union
to arbitrate over a strike may effectively stymie the union's attempts to obtain
better working conditions. Of course, the union may decide to ignore the
SId. art. 19.
67 Id. arts. 20, 22.
8 Id. arts. 23(2), 26.
69 Id. art. 28.
70 Id. art. 29.
"1 Id. art. 30.
72 Id. art. 40.
73 Id. W.41.
74 Id. art. 43.
" Id. arts. 42, 44.
76 See CHoI, supra note 3, at 272.
77 Seoul Threatens to Act on Planned Strikes, AslAN WALL ST. J., June 20, 1996, at 4.
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government's order and continue striking once emergency mediation is
decreed. However, this may be risky because when a union does not comply
with an order of emergency mediation, or any other section of the Act, it is
technically breaking the law and the State is legally justified in using police
force to break up these "illegal" strikes and arrest participants.
C. Labor Management Council Act
The Labor Management Council Act requires employers with greater
than a certain number of employees to set up intraoffice consultation
committees.78 These committees must have an equal number of employee
and employer representatives 79 and must consult about productivity, workers'
welfare, prevention of labor disputes, procedures for resolving employee
grievances, safety and health concerns, personnel matters, and "[o]ther
matters concerning labor-management cooperation. 80 The employer is also
required to set up a grievance committee for the processing of employee
complaints. 8' The language of the Act is deliberatively non-preemptive of
collective bargaining agreements82 and in unionized workplaces, employee
representatives sitting on the council must also be union members.8 3
Despite its non-preemptive language, the Act has significantly
undermined the collective bargaining process. This is partially because
employers prefer to "consult" with employees rather than bargain with the
union.8 In fact, the government passed the Act with the intention of
eventually replacing unions with labor-management councils. 85 There is no
evidence to suggest that labor-management councils actually improve labor-
management relations. For example, productivity committees have been
totally ineffective because management does not value employee input and
workers are basically disinterested in participating.8 6 Because many issues
are subject to "consultation," including industrial disputes,8 7 the operation of
7S Labor-Management Council Act, supra note 9, art. 4(1). Presently, an employer with 50 or more
employees must set up a council. OECD Economic Surveys, 1995-1996, Korea, at 104, OECD (1996).
79 Labor-Management Council Act, supra note 9, art. 6(1).
'o Id. art. 20.
s" Id. arts. 24-26.
8' Id. art. 5.
" Id. art. 6(2).
84 Kim, supra note 36, at 148.
85 You, supra note 26, at 184.
86 Kim, supra note 17, at 230-31.
87 FREDERIC C. DEYO, BENEATH THE MIRACLE: LABOR SUBORDINATION IN THE NEW ASIAN
INDUSTRILISM 137 (1989).
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the current Act denies employees the opportunity, to choose a strong
representative that can proficiently defend employee interests against
management decisions. Thus, even though labor-management councils might
be positive innovations in many countries, they cannot be used to advance
employee interests in environments where workers have traditionally been
silenced and mistreated.
IV. MODERN STATUS OF KOREAN LABOR RELATIONS
As long as the government-business nexus persists, laws providing for
broad administrative oversight of labor relations will result in labor
repression. Until recently, unions lacked the capacity to affect labor
legislation through political channels because they were precluded from
engaging in any political activity, including campaign funding.8 9 In the Spring
of 1997, the ban on political activity by unions was lifted.90 Now unions can
directly influence the political process by publicly and financially supporting
labor-friendly political candidates. However, the symbiotic relationship
between government and business continues to be a formidable obstacle.
Thus far, union pressure alone has not sufficed to alter the basic elements of
Korean labor relations. As this portion of the Comment discusses,
international pressure has been a major factor in forcing the Korean
government to rethink its stance. Continuing international pressure combined
with unions' increased political capacity could potentially result in genuine
change to the nation's labor legislation.
A. Unions and Political Influence
Throughout Korea's post-war history, labor unions have been
politically weak.9' The truism, "he who has access has influence, 92 is
particularly apt to describe Korean labor relations; employers have been able
3 See COMMISSION ON THE FuTuRE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FAcT FINDING REPORT
29-57 (1994) (considering the feasibility of worker-cmployer commaittees in United States' workplaces with a
brief discussion of these committees in Europe).
s9 Labor Union Act, supra note 7, art. 12 (repealed 1997). Workers still may not form unions for the
primary purpose of furthering political goals. Id. art. 2(4).
90 Theresa Walanabe, S. Korea Revises Disputed Labor Law Asia: Bill Offers Expanded Union
Rights. Compromise is Likely to Ease Anger that Triggered Widespread Strikes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1997, at A9.
91 CHOI, supra note 3, at 5.
9 DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESs 264 (1971).
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to shape the progression of labor relations because they have directly
influenced the lawmakers whereas workers were explicitly prohibited from
collectively pursuing change. Several ramifications arise from this
circumstance. The obvious ramification is that, because employers are not
banned from making political contributions and otherwise influencing policy,
unions had no opportunity to counteract the damage that employers were
wreaking on worker rights.
The ban on political activity also affected union structure and goals.
Unions have organized at a grass roots level because attempts to organize
large umbrella organizations resembled illicit political activity.9 3  Unions
followed the tenets of business, or economic, unionism. This means that
unions sought to attain purely economic, apolitical goals such as wage
increases or shorter work days.94 Unions' emphases on apolitical goals is
exemplified by the fact that, until recently, they used strikes and
demonstrations to compel wage increases but never to change the nation's
labor laws. 95 Thus, unions have not influenced national labor policy because
"the legislative process has provided labor with no means to wield influence
with regard to the basic labor laws. 96
Since unions have had no direct voice in the formation of labor policy,
most of their strikes and demonstrations can be viewed as reactions in
response to laws and policies that were passed without their input or
support.97 Thus, the government somewhat contributed to Korea's notorious
militant labor dissidence by forcing unions to resort to strikes to effectuate
change. If the lift of the ban on political activity permits unions to engage in
meaningful political input, the country may see a notable decrease in the
incidence of disruptive industrial action.
The lift of the ban on political activity seemed almost inevitable.
Already, unions were beginning to orient themselves towards more political
goals rather than focusing entirely on narrow, economic goals. 98  Three
93 CHOI, supra note 3, at 93. Unions' political isolation is heightened by a law that prohibits third
parties, such as church groups or student activists, from intervening in labor disputes. Labor Union Act, supra
note 7, art. 12.
94 CHOI, supra note 3, at 107-11.
95 See id. at 295. Unions recently struck over a law that displayed "arrogance and antagonism toward
just one side [promptingl a public fury and the biggest labor strikes in the nation's history." Teresa Watanabe,
S. Korea Summit May Not Do Trick Asia: President Kim and Political Foes Meet in an Effort to End
Labor Unrest. A Key Union's Agreement to Any Accord Remains a Question Mark, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
1997, at A14.
9 CHOI, supra note 3, at 256.
9' Id. at 265.
98 Koo, supra, note 32 at 156-67.
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reasons exist for unions' broadening of objectives. First, even though Korean
workers have experienced substantial wage increases over the past decade, 99
the Korean workweek is long and accident rates for workplaces are very high
compared to other modem industrialized nations.10 0 Thus, to improve the
quality of life within the workplace, unions had to pursue goals that looked
beyond pure monetary compensation.
The second reason unions have shifted away from purely economic
goals is the increasing unionization of white collar workers who entered the
labor relations arena with a greater political agenda.' 0' The influx of white
collar workers into unions also placed unions in the mainstream and helped
unions gain the support of Korea's growing middle class.'0 2 The greater
participation of middle class protestors in demonstrations also indicates that a
greater portion of the Korean workforce is angered and frightened by the
government's business-friendly legislation.1
0 3
The third reason for greater political focus by unions is the relatively
high education of the Korean workforce. 104 The increase in education has led
to greater assertiveness and confidence by Korean employees and has largely
contributed to the development of a class consciousness. 0 5 Thus, workers
have begun to see themselves as part of a larger struggle and have started to
concentrate on widespread change rather than purely immediate problems in
individual workplaces.
The relatively high education of Korean workers combined with the
increasing unionization of white collar sectors means that unions may become
particularly apt at influencing the political process. Now that the ban on
political activity has been lifted, workers may be able to mobilize and actually
impact politics. However, unions may still be somewhat hindered in their
efforts to change labor policy at the legislative level. As mentioned
previously, unions are accustomed to organizing at the grass roots level.
10 6
99 From 1985 to 1995, Korean wages increased alnmst sevenfold, rising from $1.23 per hour in
American dollars to $7.40 per hour. Outlook; Labor: We're No. 13, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., SepL 23,
1996, at 24.
'00 Alice H. Arnsden, Asia's Industrial Revolution, DISSENT, Summer 1993, at 324, 327.
'0' Koo, supra note 32, at 157.
102 You, supra note 26, at 200. See also Steven V. Brull & Catherine Keumhyun Lee, Why Seoul is
Seething: Koreans Want the Mismanaged Chaebol to Share the Economic Pain, Bus. WK., Jan 27, 1997,
at 44 (participation of middle class protestors in demonstrations indicates that a greater portion of the Korean
workforce is angered and frightened by the government's business-friendly legislation).103 Brull & Lee,supra note 102, at 44.
1 04 Kimsupra note 17, at 222.
105 You, supra note 26, at 204.
1o6 See supra text accompanying note 93.
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Although class consciousness is developing, most unions are strongest and
most vocal within the individual workplace. Although localized unions have
successfully banded together in strikes to create nationwide economic strife,
more pervasive change may not occur unless unions are able to organize
nationally and agree on an agenda that can be pursued through legislative
channels. The two legal umbrella organizations, the Federation of Korean
Trade Unions and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, 107 must
attempt to combine the efforts of their local member unions to effect real
political change.
B. Corruption Persists
Although the lift of the ban on political activity is a significant positive
change for labor unions, the persistence of the government-business nexus
and the superior financial resources of business necessitate greater change if
unions are to affect the laws that govern them. The government-business
nexus is alive and well; one need only look into Korea's very recent past to
find examples of corruption arising from this collusive relationship. In
August of 1996, two former presidents and several chaebol heads were
criminally prosecuted for numerous acts of corruption and bribery.10 8
Although the mere fact of prosecution denotes desirable change, many
commentators believe that the administration that investigated the corrupt
business leaders did so merely to appease Korean citizens and that any
punishments rendered were merely symbolic. 109
The evidence suggests that the administration that conducted the
prosecutions has also been involved in corruption. In February 1997, when a
large national steelmaker, Hanbo, went bankrupt, Korean citizens and
international observers discovered that the nation's fourteenth largest chaebol
had been receiving loans from the government-operated bank long after its
potential for bankruptcy had become apparent to lenders." 0  The
government's decision to finance the dying conglomerate was the
consequence of "corruption and cronyism" and demonstrated that the nation's
1 7 See supra note44.
log Catherine Keumhyun Lee, Unfinished Business. Kim Sends the Chaebol a Message, Bus. WK.,
Sept 9, 1996, at 56. Among those punished were the chairmen of Samsung and Daewoo, two of Korea's four
largest chaebols. Id.
'09 See id at 57.
110 Michael Schuman, Corruption in South Korea Isn't Gone Yet: Hanbo Scandal Shows Kim's
Reform Falls Shy of Goals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at A18. Koreans have dubbed the scandal
"Hanbogate." Id.
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banks "pay more attention to their borrowers' political connections than to
their ability to repay.""' Thus, unions are entering the political game as
infants in relation to employers whose positions and influence are well
established.
C. The Current Law
The most recently enacted labor law represents another example of
employers' advantage over unions in political matters. The law was passed in
a covert pre-dawn legislative session excluding opposition members of the
National Assembly. 12  The law was the clear result of chaebols' lobbying
efforts. 113  It gave unions no immediate rights while making it easier for
employers to lay off workers. 114 Prior to passage of the law, employers had
to obtain court orders before they could lay off employees) 15 The law also
permitted employers to increase the already lengthy work week and to
replace striking workers, a previously prohibited practice.116  In return, the
ban on political activity by unions was lifted 1 7 and unions were permitted to
organize on an industry-wide level," 8 but enactment of these provisions was
postponed for at lease three years." 9
Although the law was described as a "slap in the face to both its own
workers and international public opinion,' 120  it did give unions the
opportunity to demonstrate their indirect political power. After three weeks
" Mark L. Clifford & James Lin, Meltdown in Seoul: Hanbo "s Fall Shakes the System, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 10, 1997, at 50.
112 Kevin Sullivan, Thousands of Strikers Demonstrate in Seoul; Workers Protest New Labor
Legislation, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1996, at A14.
113 Catherine KeuhyUn Lee & Sheri Presso, Crunch Time for the Chaebol: Widespread Strikes
Could Thwart an Effort to Cut Costs, Bus. WK., Jan. 13, 1997, at 16. See also Sullivan, supra note 112, at
A14 ('Labor leaders see the bills as unfair collusion between the governmnt and the country's immensely
powerful corporations").
114 Ju-Yeon Kim, Seoul Police Loose Tear Gas on Protesting Workers, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1996,
at A25.
"'5 Michael Scluman & In Kyung Kim, South Korea Passes Watered-Down Labor Legislation, WALL.
ST. J., Mar. 11, 1997, at A19.
116 Labor Unions Launch Nationwide Protest Strikes, Korea Herald, Dec. 27, 1996, available in 1996
WL 15360619.
117 Id.
18 David Holley, S. Korean Strikes in Crucial Phase, Analysts Say Asia: President Kim Rejects
Unions' Demand to Scrap New Law Making it Easier to Lay Off Workers, L.A.TIMES, Jan. 7, 1997, at A12.
119 Id.
120 South Korean Workers Protest Law, Law Would Make It Easier to Have Layoffs in Asian
Country, CHARLESTON GAzETTE & DAILY MA.it (WV), Dec. 28, 1996, at P3A (statement made by labor
advisory group to the OECD).
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of strikes and a three billion dollar loss to the national economy,' 2 ' the
President repealed the bill and passed a new one that revoked the provision
making it easier to lay off employees and immediately lifted the ban on
political activity.
122
The repeal of the original bill was a significant victory for unions.
However, the mere fact of repeal should not lead to the conclusion that the
strength of unions was the sole, or even the primary, reason that the business-
friendly law was overturned. Pressure from the OECD was a major reason
behind the law's abolition. Korea joined the OECD on October 11, 1996.123
Months before Korea's admission to the Organization, other OECD member
nations expressed misgivings about Korea's labor laws' 24 since they provide
workers with comparatively few protections. 125  After Korea was admitted,
the OECD placed continuous pressure on it to amend the troublesome
portions of its laws. 126  After the National Assembly passed the law in
December of 1996, the head of the OECD's Trade Union Advisory
Committee asked the President for a veto. 127 After the President signed the
bill into law, the OECD continued to express-its disapproval.
12
As the foregoing incident illustrates, international pressure can be a
vital force in ensuring that unions are accorded full rights in Korea. Mere
pressure from the unions would probably have been insufficient to turn over
the unpopular law. Unless the OECD or other international organizations,
such as the International Labor Organization, 129 persistently intervene at this
juncture, labor repression is likely to continue.
121 Watanabe, supra note 90, at A14.
'
2 2 Id. The new law also legitimated the formerly outlawed Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. See
supra note 44.
123 Tatsuji Nagata South Korea's OECD Membership Signals Its Growth, MAINICm DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Papersap Database. Korea was the second Asian nation to join the
OECD; Japan has been a member since 1964. Id.
124 John Burton, Asia Pacific: South Korea Faces Bout of Labour Unrest, FIN. TIMEs, June 20, 1996,
at4.
12 See OECD Economic Surveys 1995-1996: Korea, supra note 78, at 105-06.
126 Labor Unions Launch Nationwide Protest Strikes, supra note 116.
127 South Korean Workers Protest Law, Law Would Make It Easier to Have Layoffs in Asian
Country, supra note 120.
12s S. Korea OKs Replacement for Unpopular Labor Law, CHI. TIUB., Mar. 11, 1997, at 9.
129 Korea has been a member of the International Labor Organization ("ILO") since 1991 even though
the ILO's governing body deems several of Korea's labor laws to be in violation of fundamental rights
contained in thdLO's constitution. Dicker, supra note 2, at 204.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
As mentioned previously, the lift of the ban on political activity
represents significant forward progression in Korea's labor laws. 130 However,
for labor repression to be alleviated, administrative oversight of labor
relations must be lessened. This section discusses remedies to some of the
problematic provisions of the laws discussed in Section III. The solution is
fairly simple: give the unions greater autonomy to conduct their affairs and
diminish the government's role in all stages of labor relations. This autonomy
could be advanced through three changes.
Many internal union affairs now under direct administrative control
should be placed beyond the scope of governmental authority. Reporting and
investigation requirements 131 should cease once a union is certified and the
administrative authority should not be permitted to compel submission of
documents 132 absent substantiated allegations of wrongdoing by the union. If
the administrative authority is stripped of its power to scrutinize union
documents, it necessarily follows that it will no longer have the right to
interpret and unilaterally amend union by-laws. 133  These limitations on
administrative control are needed to secure unions' right to self-govern
internal affairs.
Next, collective bargaining agreements should be treated like contracts
between the employer and the union, not the employer, the union, and the
state. A collective bargaining agreement should not be subject to
administrative review unless a dispute arises under its terms and the
agreement contains no machinery for dispute resolution, or the parties
disagree on what procedures the agreement actually prescribes. The present
law, permitting the State to strike terms of the agreement, 134 infects the
bargaining process at its primal stage. The State's one-sided intervention
eradicates the employer's incentive to bargain seriously. Even if a concession
to labor does creep into the agreement, the employer may be saved by the
State's erasure of the term. These consequences of the current laws have
prevented collective bargaining agreements from becoming tools of change
within the workplace. Since the collective bargaining agreement is the
desirable end product of the union's collective strength, it is essential that
13 se' e supra text accompanying notes 89-107.
131 Labor Union Act, supra note 7, arts. 13, 25.
132 Id. art. 25.
133 Id. art. 21.
134 Id. art. 31(3).
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negotiations be conducted on equal footing with minimal impediment to
compromise.
When the collective bargaining process collapses, unions may resort to
the ultimate economic weapon: the strike. An effective strike will
economically injure the employer thereby increasing the union's bargaining
power. Often, the timing of the strike will be a determinant in its
effectiveness. Since a union must forecast its intention to strike to the State
and the employer ten days prior to taking action, 135 it is prevented from using
the strike to its utmost advantage. The employer has ample time to institute
retaliatory measures which, though technically illegal, are unlikely to be
prosecuted due to selective enforcement of the laws. 3 6  The employer's
opportunity to strategize before an impending strike removes the sting from
any legal strike. Thus, unions are barred from using collective bargaining and
legal economic action to further their goals.
Lastly, the State should actively urge unions and employers to utilize
their own dispute resolution machinery. The State's dispute resolution
machinery should only be used in case of default, i.e., when the parties fail to
include their own procedures for dispute resolution in the collective
bargaining agreement. Employers will then be forced to address issues
internally by an unbiased decision-maker or neutral mediator. The very
existence of neutral dispute resolution mechanisms may deter employers from
taking actions that would clearly violate provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement or constitute unfair labor practices. Unfortunately, the
State's present intervention has created an atmosphere where employers do
not portend punishment for wrongdoing and unions do not enter the dispute
resolution process in anticipation of victory.
VI. CONCLUSION
South Korea's economic growth since the Korean War has been
phenomenal. The so-called "economic miracle"' would probably not have
been possible without the close cooperation of business and government.
Korea's regard for fundamental human rights has also grown, but this is a
fairly recent trend. Most of the nation's post-war history is marked by violent
labor repression and subversion of individual workers' basic rights. The
" Labor Dispute Mediation Act, supra note 8, art. 16.
136 See Kim, supra note 36.
137 OGLE, supra note 3.
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current laws arose out of this period of labor suppression. These laws not
only reflect the power disparities between employers and workers but also
perpetuate the imbalanced system. Until the bias is removed from the labor
laws, unions will be barred from taking giant strides to improve employment
conditions and must instead achieve their workplace gains by Lilliputian
steps.
Now that unions are permitted to engage in political activity, they have
the opportunity to directly influence labor legislation. The previously
politically weak organizations would be able to use this new power to
workers' tactical advantage. In addition, the ILO and the OECD should
continue to pressure Korea into fulfilling workers' rights to unionize and
participate in collective action. A primary goal of unions and international
organizations should be to urge Korean government to leave labor relations to
the parties involved. Many of the problems inherent in the current laws
would be eliminated if the government relinquished its extensive control over
labor relations. Even though corruption and business-government collusion
cannot be eradicated overnight, their presence need not infect labor affairs.
The government should exit the arena of labor affairs and permit unions and
employers to negotiate on even ground. This can be achieved by shearing the
present laws of many of their administrative oversight provisions and
retaining government intervention only as a means of last resort.
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